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Abstract
Background: In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the state system to remunerate health workers is
poorly functional, encouraging diversification of income sources and corruption. Given the central role that
health workers play in health systems, policy-makers need to ensure health workers are remunerated in a way
which best incentivises them to provide effective and good quality services. This study describes the different
sources and quantities of income paid to primary care health workers in Equateur, Maniema, Kasai Occidental,
Province Orientale and Kasai Oriental provinces. It also explores characteristics associated with the receipt of
different sources of income.
Methods: Quantitative data on the income received by health workers were collected through baseline
surveys. Descriptive statistics explored the demographic characteristics of health workers surveyed, and types
and amounts of incomes received. A series of regression models were estimated to examine the health
worker and facility-level determinants of receiving each income source and of levels received. Qualitative data
collection was carried out in Kasai Occidental province to explore perceptions of each income source and
reasons for receiving each.
Results: Nurses made up the majority of workers in primary care. Only 31% received a government salary,
while 75% reported compensation from user fees. Almost half of all nurses engaged in supplemental non-
clinical activities. Receipt of government payments was associated with income from private practice and
non-clinical activities. Male nurses were more likely to receive per diems, performance payments, and higher
total remuneration compared to females. Contextual factors such as provincial location, presence of externally
financed health programmes and local user fee policy also influenced the extent to which nurses received
many income sources.
Conclusions: The receipt of government payments was unreliable and had implications for receipt of other
income sources. A mixture of individual, facility and geographical factors were associated with the receipt of
various income sources. Greater co-ordination is needed between partners involved in health worker
remuneration to design more effective financial incentive packages, reduce the fragmentation of incomes and
improve transparency in the payment of workers in the DRC.
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Background
Health workers play a central role in the delivery of
health care, and their remuneration influences their
motivation and workplace performance [1–4]. Post
conflict states present an interesting context for
examining health worker remuneration as the state
system of salary payment is often poorly functional,
encouraging a diversification of income sources [5].
Donors may exacerbate income fragmentation by pro-
viding programme-related performance payments and
per diems [6]. Evidence from these settings has shown
that income received from different sources varies ac-
cording to individual worker and health facility char-
acteristics, with female workers receiving significantly
less salary and total income than male workers of the
same cadre in Sierra Leone [7], and rural workers
having less access to user fee revenue and income
from non-clinical activities to those in urban areas in
Zimbabwe [8]. A study by Bertone et al. in four prov-
inces in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
identified individual, facility and provincial determi-
nants of variation in total income received [9]. How-
ever, the Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe studies were
descriptive and did not comprehensively examine the
determinants of receiving each income source and
none of these studies looked at how receipt of one
income source affects the likelihood of receiving other
sources, or compiled qualitative data to obtain more
in-depth insights into remuneration practices. More-
over, Bertone and Witter have advocated for more
empirical research on the overall revenue or “complex
remuneration” of health workers, in order to devise
effective incentive packages [10].
This study aims to address this gap by examining the
remuneration structure of health workers in five prov-
inces of the DRC,1 assessing the determinants of receiv-
ing income by source and the inter-dependency of
different sources of income, as well as the determinants
of total income received. Qualitative methods are also
used to substantiate the quantitative findings and help to
discover the processes and mechanisms that underpin
the quantitative results.
DRC context
In 2013, public investment in health was only 4.5% of
the national budget falling far short of the Abuja com-
mitment of 15% [11]. Although all public sector health
workers should receive a salary and occupational risk
allowance (or “prime de risque”) from the government,
not everyone receives these. Services therefore rely heav-
ily on cost recovery through user fees, with no accepted
standard national tariff for consultations. Health workers
have also become dependent on performance-based
payments and/or per diems from external partners.
The public care system accounts for about half of all
facilities in the country [12]. The basic unit of the pri-
mary care health system is the health zone [13]. Health
zones are divided into health areas serving 10,000 to
15,000 people. Each health area should have a health
centre providing an essential package of primary health-
care activities. Health centres equipped to carry out cer-
tain minor surgical operations are termed reference
health centres. In the absence of a health centre or refer-
ence health centre, there is a health post.
Methods
Health facility and health worker surveys were con-
ducted as part of a baseline survey linked to an evalu-
ation of a health systems strengthening programme
funded by the Department for International Develop-
ment (DfID) called ASSP (Accès Aux Soins de Santé
Primaires) in April–May 2014 [Keating J, Hotchkiss D,
Eisele T, Kitoto AT, Bertrand J. Evaluation of the impact
of the ASSP project in the Democratic Republic of
Congo, unpublished].
Data collection was carried out by data collectors hired
from each of the provinces to ensure familiarity with the
cultural context. Participation of health workers in the
survey was voluntary. To minimise the potential for social
desirability bias, the interviewer explained the purpose,
confidentiality and anonymity of the study to each pro-
vider before seeking consent to begin the survey.
Surveys were carried out in Equateur, Kasai Occidental,
Kasai Oriental, Province Orientale, and Maniema prov-
inces in 105 intervention villages selected using probability
proportional to size (PPS), and an equal number of con-
trol villages matched on geographic location and popula-
tion size. In total, 210 facilities were selected and all
workers providing clinical services and on duty the day of
the survey were interviewed.
The health worker survey measured age, sex, cadre,
marital status, educational attainment, number of
years in their current position, and number of finan-
cial dependents. The survey identified income
sources received and income levels adapted from the
Health Worker Incentive Survey [14] for government
payments (salaries, occupational risk allowances),
performance payments and per diems from non-
governmental partners, private clinical work, user
fees from patients, informal payments2 or “gifts”, al-
lowances, and income from non-clinical activities.
Respondents were asked whether government pay-
ments were received on time, if there were delays
receiving these payments, and amounts received
compared to expectations. Income levels were re-
corded in Congolese Francs (FC). Recall was for “last
month received” for all incomes with the exception
of per diems which was for the “last year”. A facility
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survey was also carried out to measure the total
number of staff, distance of the facility from the vil-
lage, and the number of primary healthcare services
provided. Both surveys were piloted in two health fa-
cilities in Kinshasa and one facility in Bas Congo.
Qualitative research was carried out in November
2014 in four urban and four rural health zones sup-
ported by ASSP in the province of Kasai Occidental
that were not included in the survey. Two nurses
(one female and one male) were purposively selected
from a health centre in each health zone, making a
total of 16 nurses. Interviews examined the sources
and amounts of income received, and factors influen-
cing their receipt and were audio recorded in French
by RM and a local researcher. Hand written notes
were also taken.
Data analysis
Survey data were double entered into CSPro and
imported into STATA 13.0 for analysis. Income data
were converted into United States dollars (USD) using
the exchange rate of 923 FC to 1 USD.3 Grubb’s test was
applied to detect outliers in the income data, which were
removed prior to analysis. Descriptive statistics were
generated for health worker characteristics, receipt of in-
come by source and mean and median income levels.
The frequency of receipt of government payments and
income compared to expectations are also reported. Lo-
gistic regressions examined facility and health worker
characteristics associated with receiving a given income
source and linear regressions identified determinants of
the level of income received, measured as the log of in-
come. Presence of the ASSP programme was included as
an explanatory variable in all of the models. Health
worker explanatory variables were health worker age,
marital status, sex, cadre, education, years worked in
position, and the number of financial dependents;
facility-level factors were provincial location, urban-rural
status, facility type, number of staff, distance from the
nearest village, and the number of services offered. We
also examined whether receipt of certain income sources
affected the receipt of others. The hypothesised relation-
ships between the independent variables and income
sources are given in Appendix 1.
In total, 18 models were run and regression diagnos-
tics applied and adjustments made to produce unbiased
coefficients (Appendix 2). A general to specific regres-
sion specification method was used, excluding explana-
tory variables in a stepwise manner. All regressions were
performed excluding any missing values (list-wise dele-
tion) with clustering at the facility level.
Audio recordings of the interviews were tran-
scribed and a coding system was developed by RM
from the initial research themes and concepts that
emerged during data collection. Data was managed
using NVivo 10 and content analysis was used to
identify key themes.
Results
Sample characteristics
Three facilities were private clinics and so did not meet
the inclusion criteria of being public sector primary care
facilities. This left 207 facilities for analysis.
Twenty three health workers did not meet the in-
clusion criteria, leaving 453 respondents for analysis.
No health workers declined to participate in the
survey.
Health workers were mainly located in rural facilities
(80.6%) and were based in health centres (81.7%)
(Table 1). Most workers were in Kasai Occidental
followed by Maniema and Equateur. Most of the
workers were in facilities located within 5 km of the
nearest village (79.9%), and over 75% offered between six
and nine services.
Most respondents were male and between 30 and
45 years old (Table 2). Ninety percent of staff were
nurses, and only four doctors were identified across all
facilities. The majority had some secondary level educa-
tion and a third had been to university. Most workers
were married and had worked a median of 6 years in
their current position.
The analysis of income sources and levels focuses on
nurses.
Income sources and levels
Only one third of nurses reported receiving a salary
while over half received the occupational risk allow-
ance (Table 3, Fig. 1). A third of nurses did not re-
ceive any form of government payment and 18%
received both an occupational risk allowance and a
salary (Fig. 1). Of non-governmental payments, the
most frequently reported were user fees, followed by
per diems. Just under half of the sample (47%) re-
ported receiving income from supplementary non-
clinical activities. Of these most worked in agriculture
(68%), followed by trade (28%). A minority of nurses
(7%) reported receiving allowances for uniforms,
housing or transport. Less than 10% of workers (n =
29) reported receiving income from private clinical
practice, mostly practising at home (n = 24).
The highest median monthly income was for non-
clinical work outside the facility ($119), followed by the
government salary ($58). The lowest median monthly in-
come came from per diems ($9) and informal payments
($9). The median monthly income across all sources was
$85 but the mean was almost double at $165.
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Over two thirds of nurses receiving the salary and the
occupational risk allowance payments reported they
were paid on time. Seventeen percent of nurses re-
ported receiving salaries between 1 and 3 months in ar-
rears and 24% reported doing so for occupational risk
allowances. Only 2% reported receiving salaries and/or
occupational risk allowances more than 3 months in ar-
rears (Fig. 2).
Despite the overall timeliness of payments, the amounts
received from government were less than expected (Fig. 3).
Nurses complained more about the frequency of salary
payments, than of occupational risk allowances, stating
irregular salary payment with no set day of the month.
Many had to regularly request an advance from the
Table 1 Facility characteristics of sampled respondents
Facility characteristics of
sampled (n) workers
Proportion
of workers
%
Facility location (n = 453)
Rural 80.6
Urban 19.4
Province (n = 453)
Equateur 23.0
Kasai Occidental 29.8
Kasai Oriental 5.7
Maniema 27.6
Province Orientale 13.9
Type of facility (n = 453)
Health centre 81.7
Reference health centre 17.2
Health post 1.1
Distance of facility from the
village (n = 443a)
Less than 1 km 31.6
Between 1 and 5 km 48.3
Between 5 and 10 km 12.0
Greater than 10 km 8.1
Number of services provided
by facility (n = 435a)
3 to 5 services 12.2
6 to 9 services 76.1
Over 10 services 3.0
Total clinical staff present on
the day (n = 453)
1 13.3
2 34.0
3 23.8
4 16.8
5 6.6
6 4.0
7 1.6
Population catchment for area (n = 430a)
Less than 5000 48.9
5000 to 10,000 21.6
10,001 to 15,000 17.4
Greater than 15,000 12.1
aLess than 453 due to missing values for those variables
Table 2 Characteristics of health workers
Characteristics Proportion of all
workers interviewed
Proportion of
nurses
% %
Sex (n = 453) (n = 407)
Male 69.3 70.3
Female 30.7 29.7
Age (n = 453) (n = 407)
<30 years 11.5 12.3
30–44 years 59.7 60.7
45–60 years 26.1 24.6
>60 years 3.1 2.5
Marital status (n = 447a) (n = 407)
Married 90.4 91.8
Single 3.8 3.5
Widowed 3.4 2.5
Separated/divorced 2.2 2.0
Other 0.2 0.3
Education (n = 453) (n = 407)
Primary school 0.4 0.3
Secondary school 60.3 62.9
University/post-secondary
school
33.1 35.1
Not specified 6.2 1.7
Position (n = 453) N/A
Doctor 0.9
Nurse 89.8
Laboratory worker 1.1
Pharmacy worker 1.3
Traditional birth attendant 2.9
Auxiliaries, medical and nursing
assistants (other non-qualified
personnel)
4.0
N, mean, SE
(median, IQR)
N, mean, SE
(median, IQR)
Number of financial dependents 437a, 9, 4.56.
(8, 6–12)
393a, 9, 4.63.
(8, 6–12)
Years worked in current position 446a, 9, 8.72.
(6, 3–12)
403a, 9, 8.68.
(6, 3–11)
aLess than 453 for all workers or less than 407 for nurses due to missing
values for those variables
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facility as they usually ran out of money before their
next pay day. It was also common for nurses to borrow
from their family or friends to pay the rent or school
fees. Nurses reported huge variability in user fee revenue
as it was dependent on the number of patients seen at
the facility.
None of the in-depth interview respondents reported
engaging in private practice or receiving performance
payments from partners. A few reported receiving per
diems for training or vaccination campaigns. Informal
payments or gifts from patients were often in the form
of soap, fabric, or food. All nurses were dissatisfied with
total compensation received.
Income determinants
The likelihood of receiving a salary increased with
every year worked at the facility (OR 1.06, p < 0.000)
and was greater for staff working in urban facilities
(OR 2.48, p = 0.021). Nurses were more likely to re-
ceive a salary if they were in Equateur than Maniema
(0.22, p = 0.014).
The odds of receiving the occupational allowance were
greater if the nurse had more years of experience (OR
1.20, p < 0.000) and a higher number of dependents (OR
1.12, p = 0.001. The odds of receiving the occupational
allowance were highest in Province Orientale (OR 9.58,
p = 0.001) compared to Equateur, but lower in Kasai Oc-
cidental (OR 0.17, p < 0.000) or Kasai Oriental (OR 0.05,
p < 0.000) (Table 4).
In the in-depth interviews, nurses who did not get a
salary stated it was because they started working after
the last census of workers in 2006, which was used as a
basis for payroll. Some nurses felt health zone officials
discriminated against workers from certain tribal or eth-
nic backgrounds in the payment of the occupational risk
allowance.
Table 3 Proportion of nurses receiving sources of income and mean and median values of income received
Source of income Overall proportion of workers
who received source of income
Median income per month among
those receiving income in USD (IQR)
Mean income per month among those
receiving income in USD (standard
error)
Payments from government
Salary from government
(n = 407)
31.2% 52.76 (23–75) 58.06 (60.45)
Occupational risk allowance
from government (n = 407)
53.8% 12.46 (11–16) 36.57 (73.38)
Payments from other sources
Performance pay (n = 407) 24.1% 16.25 (9–46) 35.79 (48.81)
User fees (n = 406) 74.6% 19.50 (11–38) 71.02 (157.95)
Gifts/informal payments from
patients (n = 406)
16.8% 4.60 (2–11) 8.73 (10.43)
Per diems (n = 406) 51.7% 4.06 (2–8) 8.56 (26.35)
Income from private clinical
practice (n = 407)
7.1% 21.67 (11–54)a 34.02 (34.05)a
Income from supplemental
(non-clinical) activities (n = 400)
46.8% 65.01 (33–114)a 119.27 (154.62)a
Total income (n = 300a) N/A 85.05 (36–176)a 165.26 (227.55)a
N.B. For the occupational risk allowance, one outlier income was dropped from the analysis; no outliers were detected for any other income amount
aGreater than 10% of data missing as respondents had missing values for some of the amounts of income
Fig. 1 Proportion of nurses receiving: both government payments, one government payment only, or no government payments
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According to the quantitative analysis, compared to
Equateur, nurses in Maniema were more likely to receive
all other sources of income, with the exception of per
diems (Table 5). Only those with a higher number of de-
pendents were significantly more likely to receive user
fees (OR 1.07 p = 0.038).
During in-depth interviews, all nurses reported re-
ceiving income from user fees. The process for allocat-
ing user fees within the facility was usually overseen by
the head of the facility. However, record keeping was
often poor meaning the total revenue generated from
user fees and allocation process was unclear to some
nurses.
The way in which we divide (user fees)…I don’t know if
I receive the same thing. The IT (head nurse) and IA
(assistant nurse) and me, I don’t know if they give the
same thing. They give it to me, I sign, that is all.
Female, 60 years
As shown in Table 5, nurses were more likely to re-
ceive informal payments if they were not based in Equa-
teur. Staff at facilities with a higher number of personnel
were less likely to report receiving informal payments
(OR 0.67, p = 0.07) and facilities supported by ASSP re-
ported a lower likelihood of informal payments (OR
0.48, p = 0.039). Older workers were less likely to receive
informal payments (OR 0.96, p = 0.08).
The qualitative findings revealed that many nurses were
reluctant to charge informal fees, as patients were usually
so poor that they struggled to pay user fees. Nurses were
less likely to charge informal fees where communities
were well informed about the facility user fee tariff, for ex-
ample, in ASSP areas where community health commit-
tees (CODESAs) and facilities were involved in setting and
publicising tariffs, meaning nurses could be chastised by
the public for asking for informal payments.
Fig. 2 Frequency of government payments to nurses
Fig. 3 Median and mean amounts of expected and actual salary and occupational risk allowance for nurses
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…everyone knows, that if you are going to ask for
something someone will tell on you, you will be
humiliated all the same, instead of asking, you must
leave it.
Male, 42 years
Receiving income from private practice was more
common in urban than rural areas (OR 2.44, p = 0.029)
and facilities close to the village. Older workers were
also less likely to receive income from private practice
(OR 0.92, p < 0.000) and staff receiving government pay-
ments were more likely to receive income from private
practice (OR 2.76, p = 0.036). Workers in Kasai Occiden-
tal and Maniema were more likely to work privately
compared to those living in Equateur.
Reasons given by nurses for not engaging in private
practice during interviews included being based far from
private clinics, a perceived reduction in job security, and
risks of losing the chance of becoming registered with
the state and therefore receiving future government pay.
However, some admitted that those currently receiving
government pay may have been more likely to work pri-
vately to supplement their income, which is consistent
with the quantitative analysis. Some nurses voiced that
the private sector was superior to the public sector, as it
was better resourced, staff were better paid and more
motivated. However, many criticised the private sector
for poor management and a lack of accountability, with
patients not being treated according to best practice,
and no focus on preventative care.
Table 4 Logistic regressions for salary and occupational risk allowance
Odds ratio for dependent variables (SE)
Explanatory variables Salary Occupational risk allowance
Full model Reduced model Full model Reduced model
Years in position 1.06 (0.02)*** 1.06 (0.02)*** 1.19 (0.04)*** 1.20 (0.04)***
(p < 0.001)
Kasai Occidental (vs Equateur) 1.48 (0.69) 1.46 (0.64) 0.17 (0.07)*** 0.17 (0.07)***
(p < 0.001)
Kasai Orientale (vs Equateur) 1.02 (0.89) 0.71 (0.48) 0.03 (0.02)*** 0.05 (0.04)***
(p < 0.001)
Maniema (vs Equateur) 0.20 (0.13)** 0.22 (0.14)***
(p = 0.014)
1.56 (0.76) 1.30 (0.63)
Province Orientale (vs Equateur) 0.69 (0.43) 1.05
(0.52)
11.07 (7.28)*** 9.58 (6.33)***
(p = 0.001)
Population served 1.00 (0.00)** 1.00 (0.00)**
(p = 0.043)
1.00 (0.00)
Total personnel 1.43 (0.25)** 0.94 (0.19)
Urban (vs rural) 1.90 (0.86) 2.48 (0.97)**
(p = 0.021)
2.42 (1.33) 2.10 (0.91)*
Number of services 1.08 (0.12) 0.84 (0.09)
Distance of facility from village 1.00 (0.03) 1.07 (0.04)*
Reference heath centre (vs heath centre) 0.74 (0.36) 0.49 (0.24) 0.39 (0.20)*
Age 1.02 (0.02) 1.03 (0.02)
Male (vs female) 0.92 (0.31) 0.66 (0.24)
Number of dependents 0.97 (0.03) 1.11 (0.04)** 1.12 (0.04)***
(p = 0.001)
Married (vs not married) 1.10 (0.14) 0.67 (0.12)** 0.75 (0.12)*
University (vs school education) 0.77 (0.27) 1.07 (0.41)
ASSP programme 0.70 (0.28) 0.58 (0.23)
Received occupational allowance (salary model only) 1.03 (0.35) – –
Received salary (occupational risk allowance model only) – – 1.06 (0.39)
Constant 0.04 (0.05)** 0.09 (0.04)*** 0.37 (0.41) 0.21 (0.08)***
Pseudo R2 0.17 0.14 0.35 0.33
Model χ2 50.90*** 46.98*** 91.22*** 77.56***
Number observations (n) 337 383 318 318
*p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01
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In the private (facilities) the staff are self-directed but
they do not have any sanctions, they behave as they
want. But with us here, the hierarchy demands expla-
nations, there is monitoring
Female, 38 years
Staff at facilities with a higher number of personnel
were less likely to report receiving per diems (OR
0.72, p = 0.019). Nurses in reference health centres
were less likely to receive per diems (OR 0.45, p =
0.032) than those in health centres, while nurses in
facilities far from the village were less likely to earn
performance payments (OR 0.79, p = 0.001) than those
near to the village. Facilities supported by ASSP re-
ported a higher chance of receiving per diems (OR
1.80, p = 0.031) as well as workers receiving govern-
ment payments (OR 1.92, p = 0.012). Males and
workers in facilities offering a higher number of ser-
vices were also more likely to receive performance
payments and per diems.
During interviews, nurses indicated a preference for
government payments over performance payments
from development partners as they saw these as more
stable and less transient sources of income.
Because the state, I could stay with the state until
death. But the partner, will always be there for a term
of 5 years
Male, 30 years
Some of the nurses interviewed felt that per diems
were not allocated fairly.
Ah, it is not well managed (per diems), if someone
tells us there is maternity training, it is one person
who can go, from the other side it is the IT (head
nurse) and IA (assistant nurse), so we others…
nothing!
Female, 37 years
Workers reporting income from non-clinical activ-
ities were more likely to report income from private
practice (OR 2.64, p = 0.035), be based in rural areas
(OR 0.51, p = 0.025) and have a higher number of de-
pendents (OR 1.08, p = 0.008). However, workers re-
ceiving government payments appeared to be less
likely to receive income from non-clinical work (OR
0.51, p = 0.02).
Some nurses reported in interviews that those receiv-
ing government payments were actually more likely to
undertake non-clinical activities, as they knew they
would receive their government payments whether they
worked in the facility or not but this was inconsistent
with the quantitative findings. One worker admitted not
coming to work to enable cultivation of crops to earn
more income. Nurses who did not engage in supplemen-
tary non-clinical activities indicated this was due to a
lack of time or an absence of the necessary resources or
start-up capital.
They become negligent…you see, at the end of each
month, you go to the bank, you see (them) but you go
to the office and there is no-one working. They end up
perhaps going to sell things, but at the end of the
month, they will go to get their money.
Female, 30 years
Total remuneration
In Province Orientale (β = −0.47, p = 0.032) and Maniema
(β = −1.26, p < 0.000), nurses had lower levels of total in-
come than nurses in Equateur. Males earned more income
overall than females (β = 0.21, p = 0.05). Receipt of each
income source was associated with a higher overall total
income, with the exception of informal payments and pay-
ments from private clinical work (Table 6).
Discussion
Nurses constituted the majority of personnel in both pri-
mary and secondary care and were the main focus of the
study. The high variability in the amounts earned from each
income source may be due in part to the fact that nurses
make up a fairly heterogeneous group of different grades
and levels of educational attainment.
Only a minority of nurses received a government salary,
and a higher proportion received occupational allowances,
with uncertainty regarding the timing and extent of pay-
ments. Part of the reason for the difference between gov-
ernment payments is that they are managed by two
different Ministries; the Ministry of Public Sector Reform
is responsible for the payroll while the occupational risk
allowance is issued using the “declarative list” controlled
by the Ministry of Health. Several bottlenecks have also
been identified in the budget process which can result in a
low execution rate of the allocated funds [15].
The extent to which either type of government pay-
ment was received varied across the provinces, likely
due to differences in the available government budget
for remuneration and a lack of transparency in the
allocation of funds by provinces; the majority of the exe-
cuted funds by province are usually untraceable (H Col-
quhoun, pers comm). A recent study of Katanga, South
Kivu and Kasai Oriental provinces found the allocation
and execution of the health budget was inequitable and
not based on any pre-defined criteria (e.g. per capita and
health indicators) [16]. The occupational allowance also
constitutes a lower amount than the salary, potentially
allowing more nurses to be paid within the allocated
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budget. A greater proportion of the allocated health
budget goes towards the occupational risk allowance
than salaries [11]. A repeat census of workers is also
needed in order to identify nurses who have more
recently started working in facilities and ensure they
are paid. Nonetheless, the study found that receiving
government payments sometimes had the unintended
consequence of giving workers the freedom to work
in private practice or non-clinical activities, poten-
tially displacing them from their duties in public
facilities.
User fees were commonly reported, representing a sub-
stantial share of total income consistent with Bertone et
al. [9], but were also highly variable, depending on tariffs
and case load. Informal payments appeared infrequent
and small, particularly in the ASSP area which aims to im-
prove health service accountability in relation to charges
levied and payments received. Where paid, performance
payments tended to be comparable in their amount to the
occupational risk allowance and income from user fees,
and vary by geographic area depending on donor and
NGO presence. Health workers in Maniema were more
Table 6 OLS model for total remuneration
Explanatory variables Coefficient (SE)
Full model Reduced model
Years in position −0.01 (0.01)
Kasai Occidental (vs Equateur) −0.37 (0.19)* −0.27 (0.17)
Kasai Orientale (vs Equateur) −0.11 (0.30) −0.07 (0.28)
Maniema (vs Equateur) −1.27 (0.26)*** −1.26 (0.18)***
(p < 0.001)
Province Orientale (vs Equateur) −0.74 (0.24)*** −0.47 (0.22)**
(p = 0.032)
Population served 0.00 (0.00)
Total personnel −0.01 (0.08)
Urban (vs rural) 0.22 (0.26)
Number of services 0.06 (0.04)
Distance of facility from village 0.01 (0.02)
Reference heath centre (vs heath centre) −0.26 (0.21)
Age 0.01 (0.01)
Male (vs female) 0.26 (0.13)** 0.21 (0.12)*
Number of dependents −0.01 (0.02)
Married (vs not married) −0.03 (0.04)
University (vs school education) 0.11 (0.12)
Supported by ASSP programme −0.13 (0.18)
Receives salary 0.73 (0.14)*** 0.79 (0.12)***
(p < 0.001)
Receives occupational risk allowance 0.81 (0.15)*** 0.70 (0.12)***
p < 0.001
Receives performance payment 0.59 (0.18)*** 0.77 (0.15)***
p < 0.001
Receives user fees 0.65 (0.20)*** 0.75 (0.17)***
p < 0.001
Receives informal payments 0.01 (0.17)
Receives income from private clinical work −0.01 (0.25)
Receives supplemental income 1.03 (0.13)*** 1.00 (0.10)***
p < 0.001
Receives per diems 0.20 (0.13) 0.20 (0.11)*
Constant 2.45 (0.42)*** 2.91 (0.22)***
R2 0.48*** 0.44***
Number observations (n) 268 328
*p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01
Maini et al. Human Resources for Health  (2017) 15:17 Page 11 of 15
likely to receive performance payments as they were still
receiving payments from the ASSP programme at the time
of the survey, although this was being phased out. Nurses
in Maniema were also less likely to receive salaries. As the
government budget is fungible, it is possible that the gov-
ernment prioritises the allocation of salaries on areas not
supported by donor programmes. Health workers may
also be less likely to push for inclusion on the payroll if
they are receiving an income which substitutes their salary
[17]. Nonetheless, workers tended to value government
payments more than performance payments, similar to
the findings of Fox et al. [6].
Per diems were received by just over half of nurses but
contributed little to total income, consistent with Bertone
et al. [9]. Per diems were sometimes perceived to be un-
fairly managed. We found evidence of gender discrimin-
ation in the allocation of per diems as well as performance
payments, with male nurses being significantly more likely
to receive these. Several studies in low-income countries
have demonstrated how the mismanagement and abuse of
per diems and performance payments can contribute to a
negative organisational culture, on account of the tensions
they create [18–20]. Care is needed to ensure such pay-
ments are distributed equitably across facility personnel
and the same staff are not benefitting each time. Payments
for overtime were not examined here but were found to
be largely irrelevant by Bertone et al. in this context [9].
Less than 10% of workers conducted private clinical work,
which corresponds with Bertone et al. [9] and this was more
common in facilities close to villages and in urban areas
similar to evidence from other countries [8, 10]. Nurses
were more likely to engage in dual practice if they received
income from the government. Nurses not receiving
government payments thought it would be too risky to
work in private facilities as it could jeopardise their
chances of gaining registration.
Almost half of all workers engaged in non-clinical
activities to supplement their income, higher than
observed by Bertone et al. [9]. Agricultural practices
were the most common which may be because the
survey sampled predominantly in rural areas. These
activities were sometimes carried out during working
hours, which would impact on service delivery.
In terms of the total amount of income gained, dif-
ferences were driven by both individual and provincial
characteristics, again similar to Bertone et al. [9].
Males were more likely to receive a higher total in-
come than females, indicating a gender inequity in re-
ceipt of income [21], while workers in Equateur were
more likely to earn more than those in Province
Orientale or Maniema. Unlike Bertone et al. [9], we
did not find any association between facility charac-
teristics and total income; however, their study in-
cluded a wider variety of facilities.
This study attempts to shed some light on the complex
puzzle of how to incentivise vital health workers in hard-
to-reach areas in the context of a fragile state. Future pol-
icies should try to address some of the unacceptable in-
equalities related to gender or provincial location. There is
low satisfaction with the amount received from formal
sources, necessitating an increase in the current wage al-
lowance, as well as perhaps the provision of non-financial
incentives such as training and opportunities for career
progression in order to effectively retain the workforce.
There were several limitations to this study. Firstly, the
health worker survey was limited to those available on the
day of the survey and does not capture the views of those
absent. Secondly, workers may have under-reported or in-
accurately recalled their income [22]. As robust documen-
tation of health worker incomes does not exist in the
DRC, it was not possible to validate estimates. Due to re-
source constraints, qualitative interviews could only be
conducted in one of the five provinces and so we were un-
able to identify reasons for the provincial variation ob-
served. The qualitative interviews preceded the analysis of
the quantitative data, and so the quantitative findings
could not be discussed during the interviews. A further
study which uses the findings of the quantitative analysis
as a basis for interviews may allow for more nuanced
views. Finally, the facilities sampled represent 2.3%4 of the
overall number of state primary care health centres and
therefore the results are not necessarily representative of
the provinces as a whole.
Conclusions
In this study, we found that few workers received a gov-
ernment salary but a larger proportion received govern-
ment payment through the occupational risk allowance.
Often, there was a mixture of individual, facility and
geographical factors associated with the receipt of vari-
ous income sources. Greater co-ordination is therefore
needed between all partners involved in the remuner-
ation of workers in order to design more effective finan-
cial incentive packages, reduce the fragmentation of
incomes and improve transparency in the payment of
workers in the DRC.
Endnotes
1At the time of the study, DRC was composed of 11
provinces which have since been divided into 26
provinces.
2Informal payments defined as payments made by pa-
tients outside of official channels
3Exchange rate as of 26 June 2015 using FOREX cur-
rency converter.
4Calculated using population data obtained from the
Direction d’Etudes et Planification, Ministère de la Santé
Publique in October 2013.
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Appendix 1
Table 7 Hypothesised relationship of independent variables with income sources
Variables Hypothesised relationship with income sources
Age The older the worker, the more likely they are to gain income as elders are respected in DRC (Oppong
& Woodruff, 2007). In addition, older workers will have been working for longer and may be paid more
based on their experience.
Sex Globally, while women comprise the majority of employees in the formal health system, they are
usually less likely than men to hold senior roles, which tend to receive more pay (World Health
Organization, 2010). In a study in Sierra Leone, for certain cadres, women received significantly less
salary than males (Witter et al., 2015). In addition, according to the latest Gender Equality Index, DRC
was ranked near the bottom (United Nations Development Programme, 2014). Therefore, it will be
interesting to examine whether gender inequality also exists in the receipt of certain sources of income
(e.g. user fees) when health worker position and education is controlled for. A study in Tajikistan has
shown that women are equally as likely as men to charge informal payments once other factors have
been controlled for but this has not been explored in other contexts (Dabalen & Wane, 2008). The same
study also showed that women were less likely to work outside of the health facility than men.
Number of dependents There is some evidence that in DRC, those that earn more have a higher number of dependents and so
the number of dependents may increase as overall income increases (Weijs, Hilhorst, & Ferf, 2012).
Urban-rural status Urban areas have a higher population density and so income from user fees may be higher. There are
also large discrepancies in access to healthcare between urban and rural areas, with access being
higher in urban areas, which may also affect income gained from user fees (World Bank, 2008).
Opportunities to receive income from dual practice may be greater in urban areas compared to rural
areas, as was observed in Zimbabwe (Chirwa et al., 2014). In addition, a study in Malawi revealed that
urban health workers had higher monthly household incomes compared to their rural counterparts
(Bowie, Mwase, & Chinkhumba, 2009).
Province There are large differences in poverty between provinces in the DRC which may have implications for
both formal and informal fees charged to patients (Moummi, 2010; United Nations Development
Programme, 2009). Equateur is comparatively poorer than the other provinces that have been sampled.
According to a recent study, there are wide provincial disparities in domestic public spending on health
services, which may affect the amount of government payments received by workers (UNICEF, 2015;
World Bank, 2008).
Total number of staff delivering healthcare
present on the day
There is some evidence that facilities with more staff receive more income than understaffed facilities
(Murro & Pavignani, 2012). On the other hand, income from user fees may be reduced as they are
usually divided among workers at the end of the month. Having a high number of personnel may
result in lower amounts being received by each staff member (Bertone & Lurton, 2015).
Number of services offered Increasing the number of services available to a population is one way of improving access (Gulliford
et al., 2002). This improved access may be reflected in increased utilisation rates resulting in higher
incomes from user fees.
Distance of the facility from the village Evidence has shown that distance travelled by patients is a key determinant of the utilisation of health
services, and so may impact on the amount of user fees collected at facilities (Shannon, Bashshur, &
Metzner, 1969).
Education The level of education will vary by position and within positions. Doctors should hold a seven-year uni-
versity degree, while the education of nurses depends on their grade; it varies between two years of
secondary school to a three year university degree (Yngfors & Andersson, 2010). The difference in grade
(and therefore education) is reflected in the payment of salaries.
Marital status Several wage determination studies have found a positive wage effect of marriage even when other
variables such as productivity and hours worked have been controlled for (Korenman & Neumark, 1991;
Pfeffer & Ross, 1982; Kalachek & Raines, 1976; Hill, 1979).
Years in position The longer a worker has been in their position, the more likely they are to receive a salary as they may
have been identified in the last comprehensive health worker census in 2006. This census aimed to
ensure workers were correctly registered on the government payroll.
Type of facility Reference facilities are bigger, offer more services and serve a greater population compared to health
centres. Therefore, income opportunities may be different within each.
Total population of village User fees and therefore total income are influenced by demand factors such as the total population
eligible to access healthcare.
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